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ABSTRACT. Previous research on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security has focused on governmental actions and 
policy recommendations. While these studies have produced some fine scholarship on those matters, Canadian public opinion 
on Arctic issues has been mostly assumed or analyzed on an anecdotal basis. This paper aims to correct this shortcoming 
by drawing the contours of public preferences on Arctic issues and assessing the impact of government activism on those 
preferences. An examination of 18 opinion polls conducted between 2006 and 2015 that questioned respondents directly 
or indirectly on circumpolar affairs concluded that Canadians do not prioritize the Arctic among other national priorities, 
although they rank it high as a foreign policy and defense priority. Additionally, even though increasing military presence in the 
Arctic seems at first glance to receive an exceptionally high level of support, a more careful examination of the data suggests 
that a majority of Canadians supports an approach to Arctic sovereignty that is rooted in compromises and negotiations.
Key words: Arctic sovereignty; Arctic security; Canadian Arctic; public opinion; public preferences; Canadian foreign policy; 
circumpolar region; opinion polls; issue saliency; military sovereignty
RÉSUMÉ. Par le passé, les études effectuées en matière de souveraineté et de sécurité dans l’Arctique canadien portaient 
principalement sur les actions du gouvernement et sur les recommandations de politiques. Bien que ces études aient permis 
d’obtenir de l’excellente information à ce sujet, l’opinion publique des Canadiens à propos des enjeux de l’Arctique a été 
soit largement présumée, soit analysée en fonction d’anecdotes. Ce document vise à remédier à ce manque en présentant les 
grandes lignes des préférences du public au sujet des enjeux propres à l’Arctique et en évaluant les incidences de l’activisme 
du gouvernement à l’égard de ces préférences. L’examen de 18 sondages d’opinion réalisés entre 2006 et 2015, sondages 
comprenant des questions directes ou indirectes à l’égard des affaires circumpolaires, a permis de conclure que les Canadiens 
ne classent pas l’Arctique au rang des autres priorités nationales, et ce, même s’ils considèrent l’Arctique comme un sujet 
important en matière de politique étrangère et de priorité de défense. En outre, même si, a priori, l’intensification de la présence 
militaire dans l’Arctique semble recevoir un soutien exceptionnellement grand, l’examen plus approfondi des données suggère 
que la majorité des Canadiens appuie une approche envers la souveraineté de l’Arctique qui est enracinée dans les compromis 
et les négociations.
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politique étrangère du Canada; région circumpolaire; sondages d’opinion; importance de l’enjeu; souveraineté militaire
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INTRODUCTION
Public opinion is difficult to delineate with precision. How-
ever, on some issues, we see clear manifestations of pub-
lic preferences being expressed; Arctic sovereignty is such 
an issue. In 1969 and 1985, sovereignty crises with the 
United States questioning the status of the Northwest Pas-
sage spurred public outrage, intensive media coverage, and 
pleas for the Canadian government to do more in the Arc-
tic (Rothwell, 1993). Confronted with a passionate popular 
reaction, an initially passive government adopted a more 
vigorous approach and reacted with groundbreaking ini-
tiatives (e.g., implementation of the Arctic Waters Pollu-
tion Prevention Act in 1970; Government of Canada, 2016) 
and announcements of ambitious investments (proposed 
construction of a world-class icebreaker in 1985). Although 
these crises stressed the importance of public opinion, they 
represented spasms followed by periods of great apathy and 
indifference. Periodic amnesia is a fundamental charac-
teristic of how most Canadians relate to their northern ter-
ritory. However, the Arctic still holds great symbolic and 
political capital among the Canadian public; though few 
Canadians have ever been to the Arctic, most think Cana-
da’s claims there are important (Nicol and Heininen, 2009). 
Thus the Arctic is part and parcel of the definition of the 
Canadian identity. Unfortunately, public preferences on 
Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (CASS) have not 
been studied systematically; we have only anecdotal evi-
dence of public support for such policies. Following Hue-
bert (1999), this article considers sovereignty and security 
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in the Canadian Arctic as interrelated issues and not as 
separate domains. The conceptual boundaries of these two 
issues are blurred in the context of global warming. Schol-
arship on CASS has tended to focus on how effective gov-
ernmental measures are in strengthening Canada’s Arctic 
sovereignty claims or whether Arctic relations are mostly 
cooperative or mostly conflictual (Coates et al., 2008; 
Riddell-Dixon, 2008; Huebert, 2009). Public opinion has 
been assumed to be constant or uniform. Such a position 
may be understandable considering the few opinion polls 
conducted on these questions, but it opens the door for 
sweeping generalizations about public preferences. Since 
public opinion often influences governmental measures, 
especially in a democratic regime like Canada (Soroka and 
Wlezien, 2004; Herle, 2007), evaluating the effectiveness 
or origin of policies without understanding public opinion 
would offer only a partial portrait of the situation. Devel-
oping a more complex view of public opinion is crucial to 
informed discussion of Arctic sovereignty and security and 
may challenge long-held assumptions about how Canadians 
relate to these issues. 
This paper aims to fill this gap by examining 18 opinion 
polls conducted on CASS from 2006 to 2015. This inquiry 
is exploratory in nature, since very little has been done on 
this front, and has two main goals. The first is to sketch 
the contours and persistent patterns of public preferences 
on CASS. Three areas will be investigated: the saliency of 
Arctic issues in the public mind, Canadians’ perceptions 
of the Arctic, and the solutions the public supports to rein-
force CASS. The second goal is to evaluate the influence 
of geopolitical developments and governmental rhetoric 
on public opinion of these matters. The release of the sec-
ond edition of the Rethinking the Top of the World survey 
funded by the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Programme 
in April 2015 allows for such an analysis (EKOS, 2015). In 
Canada, 2007–10 was a period of activism on CASS, with 
prominent intellectual debates, frequent opinion polls, and 
announcements of government policies and investments. 
The Harper government’s active (and at times aggressive) 
approach towards the Arctic characterized this time (Nos-
sal, 2013:26–27). International relations were also in a state 
of flux, with many non-Arctic states wanting a role in con-
structing regional governance of the circumpolar world. 
However, this dynamism cooled off when the five coastal 
states on the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, the 
Russian Federation, and the United States) met in Green-
land and agreed on shared expectations, as expressed in the 
Ilulissat Declaration, which included cooperation with other 
interested parties within the framework of existing legisla-
tion (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008). The relative stability 
resulted in a quasi-absence of any opinion polls published 
on these questions, especially in Canada, where the bulk of 
Arctic announcements were made before 2010. The publi-
cation of the 2015 Rethinking survey allows insights into 
possible changes in public preferences. Can we observe a 
change in public opinion of the Arctic since 2010, when 
the Canadian government became less active in framing 
Arctic issues as sovereignty issues? Before assessing the data 
collected, it is imperative to look at how past researchers 
studied CASS. 
CANADA AS AN ARCTIC COUNTRY
Canada established its legal and constabulary presence 
in the Arctic in the first half of the 20th century with the 
objective of asserting sovereignty over this sparsely popu-
lated area (Grant, 2005). The Arctic was also a unifying 
idea in building Canada as a nation and remains a marker 
of Canadian identity today; it helped to define Canada as 
a northern country and to unite francophones and anglo-
phones (Griffiths, 1979; Lasserre, 1998; Arnold, 2010). 
The media have been perceived as promoting the notion 
that the United States had refused to consult Canada over 
the 1969 transit of the Northwest Passage by SS Manhat-
tan (although bilateral consultations had taken place) and 
thus strengthening the idea that the American action was 
a direct threat to Canadian sovereignty (Rothwell, 1993). 
Public alarm and nationalist sentiments pushed the Gov-
ernment of Canada to enact ambitious measures to address 
these concerns, which included extending Canadian mari-
time jurisdiction through the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre-
vention Act in 1970. However, the Canadian Arctic was 
quickly forgotten once these sovereignty crises faded. 
Scholarship tended to follow the same boom-and-bust 
pattern (Cornut, 2010). Studies on Arctic sovereignty 
and security were focused on two main axes of interest: 
the juridico-legal status of the Arctic archipelago and the 
Northwest Passage on the one hand, and the strategic role 
of the Arctic vis-à-vis the USSR in the global confrontation 
of the Cold War. The pioneering work of Donat Pharand 
(Pharand, 1979; Vanderzwaag and Pharand, 1983) came to 
characterize the former, while the latter was mostly inves-
tigated through a strategic studies lens by realist authors 
such as Critchley (1984). In the cooperative international 
environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War, aca-
demic attention turned to comparing potential institutional 
arrangements that would lay the basis for regional govern-
ance in the Arctic. The diplomatic efforts that led to crea-
tion of the Arctic Council are examples of this phenomenon 
(Scrivener, 1999; Roussel and Fossum, 2010). 
In the past few decades, a debate centered on the impacts 
of global warming on the Canadian Arctic has emerged. 
This exchange was initially led by two scholars, Rob 
Huebert and Franklyn Griffiths, who disagreed on the 
extent of the challenge that global warming posed to Can-
ada’s Arctic sovereignty claims. However, like most Arctic 
scholars, both agree that the Canadian government aban-
doned the region and withdrew key investments, which led 
them to suggest that the Government of Canada should do 
more to ensure a stronger presence (whether military or 
civil) in its portion of the Arctic (Huebert, 1999; Griffiths, 
2009). This same debate has persisted since, with Whitney 
Lackenbauer (2010, 2013) replacing Griffiths as the main 
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proponent of a more moderate position on the consequences 
of global warming for Canadian sovereignty claims. This 
moderate opinion was also dominant in the Canadian media 
views on the region, although the Arctic was not a subject of 
great interest from 2000 to 2005 (Landriault, 2013:53–96). 
The dominant focus in the first decade of the new mil-
lennium was speculative assessment of the transforma-
tive effect of climate change on the geopolitical reality of 
the Arctic region. Policy-making recommendation was 
the principal angle taken by scholars within this sub-field 
of inquiry. The assessment of different emerging state and 
non-state threats to Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and secu-
rity constituted the norm, with a heavier focus on state 
behaviors and interests. Activism by the governments of 
Denmark (Huebert, 2005; Stevenson, 2007), the United 
States (Huebert, 2009; Byers, 2010a), and Russia (Byers, 
2010b; Lackenbauer, 2010; Charron et al., 2012) was ana-
lyzed in detail to evaluate their intentions in regard to the 
development of the Arctic. More recently, non-Arctic coun-
tries have been scrutinized, with China monopolizing 
attention (Wright, 2011; Manicom and Lackenbauer, 2013; 
Huang et al., 2015). 
Governmental policy has been the focus of most schol-
arly studies of Canadian Arctic security and sovereignty 
issues. As a result, Canadian public opinion preferences 
and perceptions of the Arctic have been little investigated. 
Of course, popular perceptions and representations of the 
Canadian Arctic have been studied previously, although not 
in a statistical fashion, giving attention primarily to north-
ern symbols, myths, and narratives present in Canadian 
culture and in the construction of Canadian identity. Many 
studies have chosen to direct their attention to specific 
(often historical) case studies (Grant, 2005; Arnold, 2008, 
2010) of how these perceptions have colored governmental 
or cultural practices of the North or the Arctic that are con-
sidered to be part of Canadian national identity (Lasserre, 
1998; Coates and Morrison, 2000; Williams, 2011). 
In many cases, public opinion and popular perceptions 
have been assumed without clear empirical evidence. For 
example, Griffiths (2009:26) wrote that “prone to exagger-
ated threat assessment and overly insistent on the need for 
hardware to assert control, Canadians in the grip of pos-
session anxiety are given to self-doubt when actually the 
outlook is good…Canadians worry, and journalists and 
editorialists feed on this worry…they join a misguided dis-
course and reinforce it by committing to still more resolute 
defenses of sovereignty.” Lackenbauer (2009:2) expresses 
a similar idea when he states that “tapping into primordial 
national anxieties about the potential loss of sovereignty—
usually to the behemoth to the South—this threat resonates 
with Southern Canadians who have taken little interest in 
their Arctic and have been led to believe that military capa-
bilities will shield Canada.” Others have also defended 
the idea that Canadians have great (often misguided) fears 
about Arctic sovereignty (Riddell-Dixon, 2008; Coates et 
al., 2009; Nicol and Heininen, 2009). Those authors assume 
that interest in the Arctic is sporadic for most Canadians, 
but that from time to time, counterintuitively, the region is 
elevated to the status of national concern. 
Another assumption is that most Canadians perceive 
military presence as the primary means to push Canada’s 
Arctic claims (Roussel, 2010). A last (implicit) assumption 
is that public opinion reacts directly to social and political 
pressures (from the media and government), a claim that is 
difficult to prove. In attempting to do so, this paper divides 
the time in two: 2007–10, a period of great media and gov-
ernmental activism on Arctic matters (Landriault, 2013), 
and 2011–15, a period with little such activity. 
Little attention has been devoted to opinion polls as a 
way to pinpoint patterns of public preferences and support 
these claims with systematic evidence. This paper gathers 
data from 18 opinion polls conducted between 2006 and 
2015 that questioned Canadians either directly or indirectly 
on the Arctic (Table 1). Different commercial polling firms 
conducted these inquiries: Nanos Research (7 polls), Angus 
Reid (4), Ipsos Reid (3), EKOS (2) and Environics (2). All 
surveys were of high quality and used rigorous methods. 
Samples were representative of the Canadian population, 
allowing for generalizations to the whole Canadian popu-
lation, and the surveys were done either by telephone or 
through an online panel whose members were randomly 
recruited to participate. Wording and question format var-
ied from poll to poll, and the impact of these variations will 
be discussed in subsequent sections. The first concern is to 
understand whether Canadians consider Arctic sovereignty 
and security to be pressing issues that demand immediate 
attention and considerable resources.
ISSUE SALIENCY AND PRIORITY
Are CASS issues considered a priority by the Canadian 
public? To answer this question, we need to distinguish 
between polls in which the Arctic was suggested as an 
answer and those in which it was not. In those surveys that 
did not prompt respondents, the Arctic does not appear to 
be on the political radar of Canadians. The Arctic is under 
the bar of 3% in three Nanos Research polls that asked peo-
ple to name their most important national issue of concern 
(Nanos Research, 2009, 2010a, 2014). Questions about what 
Canada’s top international priority should be produced a 
similar result (Anon., 2008). When questioned explicitly 
on the importance of the Arctic region in relation to other 
priorities, Canadians reemphasize the relatively low level of 
priority given to this policy area. In Nanos polls conducted 
in 2011 and 2012, asserting Arctic sovereignty came at the 
very bottom of the list of national priorities (Fig. 1). A simi-
lar conclusion can be reached for a 2008 Ipsos Reid poll that 
placed asserting Arctic sovereignty last in a list of eight pri-
orities, trailing behind even the highly unpopular mission 
in Afghanistan (Ipsos Reid, 2008).
Nonetheless, there is a general, albeit vague and abstract, 
consensus that Canada should do more by investing heav-
ily in its Arctic region. This statement gathered the assent 
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of 75% to 80% of respondents in three different polls from 
2007 to 2009, even after major new investments were 
announced by the Government of Canada (Angus Reid, 
2007b, 2008; Public Works and Government Services Can-
ada, 2010:18). The quasi absence (12%) of interviewees 
advocating that Canada should do less for the Arctic (Ipsos 
Reid, 2008) also contributes to making the Arctic policy 
area one with very few opponents; apathy and forgetfulness 
represent more difficult challenges.
Moreover, CASS registers as an issue specifically rooted 
in foreign policy and defense matters. Indeed, in the 2010 
edition of the Rethinking the Top of the World inquiry, 54% 
of respondents agreed that the Arctic should be the num-
ber one priority of Canada’s foreign policy (EKOS, 2011). 
The region also arrived at the top of the foreign policy pri-
ority list (out of five options) in a 2008 poll (Anon., 2008). 
In defense policy, increasing military defense in the Arctic 
ranked third by respondents, behind only peacekeeping and 
North American security co-operation (Nanos Research, 
2010b).
Thus Arctic sovereignty does not appear to be naturally 
on people’s minds even in a period of great activism (from 
2007 to 2010, for example). Rather, it is a minor concern or 
relegated to specific areas of governmental activity. Noth-
ing in these surveys points in the direction of issues deemed 
salient by the Canadian population. The Arctic was placed 
last in all seven polls (Ipsos Reid, 2008; Nanos Research, 
2008, 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012; EKOS, 2010) that asked 
respondents to rank different public policy domains in 
order of priority. The region found resonance when framed 
in specific policy areas, like defense or foreign affairs; all 
three polls (Environics, 2007–08, 2009; EKOS, 2010) link-
ing the Arctic to these subject matters suggested that the 
region was considered a top priority. 
CANADIAN ARCTIC PERCEPTIONS
Are Canadians taken with a possession anxiety, as 
argued by Griffiths? Belief in erroneous information about 
the circumpolar world is widespread and can create a 
false sense of entitlement to polar territory and resources. 
According to a November 2007 poll, 53% of Canadians 
understood that the natural resources at the bottom of the 
Arctic Ocean belong to Canada, a claim that needs to be 
substantiated given that other countries also claim that 
the Arctic continental shelf is theirs (Angus Reid, 2007a). 
A similarly confident (and factually wrong) stance can be 
reported from a 2015 poll on the Northwest Passage, in 
which only 28% of Canadians interviewed gave the cor-
rect response, describing the status of the Northwest Pas-
sage as in dispute (EKOS, 2015:7). Additionally, only 30% 
of respondents correctly identified the Arctic Ocean (rather 
than the Northwest Passage) as Canada’s northern bound-
ary. No notable differences can be established on this last 
point between Northerners and Southerners, since both 
made the mistake in the same proportion (Public Works and 
Government Services Canada, 2010:18). 
Inquiries that measured the level of national anxiety 
about a possible loss of Arctic sovereignty offer a mixed 
(and confusing) portrait of public preferences. In a 2009 
Environics survey commissioned by the Department of 
TABLE 1. Chronological list of opinion polls used in this study and the main slant of each inquiry. 
Poll # Time of poll Polling firm Subject matter
1 August 2006 Ipsos Reid Prime Minister’s Arctic tour
2 February 2007 Angus Reid Preferred approach to Canadian Arctic sovereignty 
3 August 2007 Angus Reid Reactions to Russian actions
4 November 2007 Angus Reid Ownership of Arctic resources
5 August 2008 Ipsos Reid Government Arctic investments
6 August 2008 Angus Reid Nature of threats in Arctic 
7 October 2008 Nanos Research National issues of concern in Canada
8 December 2007 – January 2008 Environics Foreign affairs priority
9 January – February 2009 Environics Arctic security and sovereignty 
10 March 2009 Nanos Research National issues of concern in Canada 
11 November 2009 Ipsos Reid Knowledge of Inuit and North 
12 November 2010 EKOS Arctic security and sovereignty
13 May – June 2010 Nanos Research National issues of concern in Canada
14 October 2010 Nanos Research National defense priorities
15 May 2011 Nanos Research Long-term priorities in Canada
16 May 2012 Nanos Research Long-term priorities in Canada
17 September – October 2014 Nanos Research National issues of concern in Canada
18 March 2015 EKOS Arctic security and sovereignty
FIG. 1. Long-term priorities of Canadians as expressed in Nanos Research 
surveys conducted in May 2011 and May 2012. The numbers above each bar 
indicate the percentage of respondents that gave priority to each issue.
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National Defense, 54% of Canadians questioned believed 
that the country currently faced a threat to its Arctic sov-
ereignty and to the security of its northern border (Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, 2010:18). Simi-
larly, in a 2010 poll (Nanos Research, 2010b), only 19% of 
respondents did not see major Arctic players as a threat to 
Canada’s Arctic territory; most Canadians perceived these 
state actors as representing some kind of danger to Cana-
dian sovereignty. The possession anxiety hypothesis seems 
to find unequivocal support in these two polls.
Again, however, question format matters. In fact, quite 
a different picture emerged when subjects were asked, 
unprompted, to name the most important issue facing the 
Canadian Arctic. The belief that there is a threat to Cana-
da’s sovereignty falls sharply to 16%, and the environment 
is mentioned more than twice as often (EKOS, 2011). More-
over, interviewees tended to think of security more in terms 
of environmental protection or social and economic needs 
rather than in terms of national or physical security threats 
(see Fig. 2). These findings indicate that external threats 
to Arctic sovereignty take a backseat to internal problems 
such as lack of socio-economic development and environ-
mental protection. 
Since it is difficult to perceive a consensus on the level of 
danger to which Canada is exposed in the Arctic region, the 
type of solution preferred by Canadians to assert Canada’s 
claim could possibly help us clarify this aspect. If national 
anxiety about the loss of sovereignty grows, it is likely that 
support for additional military capabilities will follow. 
HOW TO DEFEND A NORTHERN BORDER?
Given the long history of engagement of the Canadian 
Armed Forces in the Arctic (Lackenbauer and Farish, 
2007), the military institution seems to be a logical choice 
to reaffirm Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and guarantee Arc-
tic security. However, since most Canadians perceive the 
Arctic as a foreign policy issue, they give wide support to 
reliance on international organizations, construction of 
international laws and norms, and the search for compro-
mise and negotiations, even when faced with a staunch 
government rhetoric opposing these strategies (Paris, 2014). 
This liberal approach based on conciliation and diplomacy 
contrasts with a conservative one based on firmness and 
rooted in military strength, resources, and presence. This 
divide has been tracked in different opinion polls to assess 
the type of Arctic activism desired by Canadians. A major-
ity of Canadians support a bolstered military presence and 
increased military resources in the polar region, although 
this support has declined as relations between the nations 
bordering the Arctic have improved (see Fig. 3).
Examining only polls that ask respondents whether or 
not they support an increase of military resources leaves the 
observer with a partial understanding of public preferences. 
Indeed, when asked if they agreed with statements calling 
for an increased Canadian military presence, 50% to 70% 
of respondents supported such statements. At first glance, 
the militaristic solution seems to garner an exceptionally 
high level of support from the Canadian populace. How-
ever, similar questions on other types of Arctic priorities 
earned even higher degrees of approbation. For example, 
higher levels of agreement were expressed for strengthen-
ing climate change policies and Inuit culture and language 
(EKOS, 2011). In fact, strengthening military presence was 
last on a list of various priorities (culture, socio-economic 
needs, environmental regulation), which casts quite a dif-
ferent light on the popularity of the conservative approach. 
The 2010 Rethinking the Top of the World survey intro-
duced doubt about the supposedly widespread agreement 
regarding Arctic military spending. Indeed, when respond-
ents were asked to pick one of two public policy options, 
they chose increasing Canadian military presence in only 
31% of cases, compared to 57% for providing more regula-
tions to protect the environment and 68% for building bet-
ter infrastructure (EKOS, 2011). Accordingly, when asked 
what Canada needs to do to defend its Arctic claims, Cana-
dians seem to choose “greater military presence” as the 
default answer; however, this choice may express a natu-
ral association of military with the Arctic based on history, 
rather than their true preferences. In a 2009 Environics 
poll (Public Works and Government Services Canada, 
2010), when asked to propose possible solutions to secure 
Canada’s claim, respondents gave the military solution 
FIG. 2. Relative importance of five definitions of Arctic security as expressed 
in the EKOS polls (EKOS, 2011, 2015). Percentage of respondents who 
considered each to be important for protection of the Arctic (EKOS, 2011). 
FIG. 3. Levels of support for the conservative approach as shown in 17 polls 
conducted from 2007 to 2015.
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first place. However, when given four options (including a 
greater military presence), they strongly preferred negotia-
tions with other countries and mapping of Arctic geogra-
phy and resources (Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2010:18). This result highlights the importance of 
presenting the full breadth of possible policies to the Cana-
dian public to get a clearer picture of public preferences. 
Both the Environics poll in 2009 and the EKOS poll in 2010 
asked respondents to rank the military option and other 
options by preference, and both results highlighted the low 
level of popular support for a militaristic strategy. 
Another pattern that can be discerned from scrutinizing 
opinion polls is the general thirst for a rule-based region. 
This desire is especially clear from the 2010 and 2015 
Rethinking polls. Overwhelming support for the creation 
of a nuclear-free zone in the Arctic (77% in 2010, 80% in 
2015), coupled with majority support (61% in 2010, 55% in 
2015) to extend the Arctic Council mandate to cover mili-
tary security, are telling in this regard (EKOS, 2011, 2015). 
Likewise, the preferred approaches to border disputes are 
fostering common understanding and respecting common 
norms and rules (Fig. 4).
It should be noted that the “international territory” 
option is seen as an extension of the “negotiating a com-
promise” option, rather than as a contradiction to it. The 
international territory option would make the Arctic an area 
open to all and limit activities that could potentially take 
place in the region. The Arctic region would be faced with 
a treatment similar to that of Antarctica under the Antarc-
tica treaty. Hence, both options can be understood as part of 
a liberal approach to international relations, which empha-
sizes conciliation and diplomacy. Taken together, they gar-
nered the support of 51% of respondents in 2010 and 58% in 
2015. 
The rise of the international territory option could have 
been prompted by activism by vocal non-governmental 
organizations, such as Greenpeace, that propose creat-
ing an Arctic sanctuary free of commercial fishing, drill-
ing, and mining. However, looking at opinion polls, we 
can find evidence that this idea already had a solid base in 
Canada’s public consciousness. In a 2008 poll, a majority 
of Canadians (57%) supported the position that Canada 
should leave the Arctic ecosystem relatively untouched by 
natural resource extraction (Ipsos Reid, 2008). Two years 
later, in an EKOS poll (2011:31) that asked respondents 
to rank 12 priorities for the Canadian Arctic region, the 
option of “increasing the development of mining of natu-
ral resources” ranked tenth in priority. The Canadian public 
did not accept the idea that it was urgent to extract natu-
ral resources as an exercise of sovereignty—and to do so 
sooner, rather than later, to fend off potential foreign rivals. 
Government activism and media coverage seem to have 
affected public preferences. Different outcomes could have 
resulted during the time of more turbulent Arctic relations 
from 2007 to 2010. For example, Canadians could have per-
ceived diplomacy and the search for compromise as a pref-
erable way to counteract instability and uncertainty about 
Canada’s Arctic claims or to oppose the Harper govern-
ment’s aggressive, pro-military approach to these matters. 
This scenario did not materialize. Instead, we have seen 
public opinion being influenced by governmental rhetoric 
and media coverage that questioned the solidity of Can-
ada’s claims. These pressures broadened public support 
for a firmer approach to solving disputes that emphasized 
increasing the presence of the Canadian Armed Forces 
north of 60. Support for more military muscle decreased 
after 2010 as the dust settled on most contentious Arctic 
issues. 
CONCLUSION
CASS issues remain puzzling. Compared to other 
national priorities, they arouse only peripheral interest, yet 
the public would place them at the top of the foreign policy 
agenda. Despite feeling that government should invest more 
heavily in the Arctic, Canadians made no uproar when the 
Conservative government downgraded initial investments 
(fueling station, offshore patrol ships) and postponed oth-
ers (icebreaker). In this regard, the present data support the 
conclusion of Coates et al. (2008:147) that there are “few, if 
any, consequences from backing away from commitments 
to protecting the North from future intrusions.” 
As for the perception of threats, evidence is mixed, and 
any conclusion is rendered more complex by the miscon-
ceptions about this region (especially factual information 
about geography, people, and international law) that many 
Canadians share. Certainly, we cannot pretend that Cana-
dians are possessed by uncontrollable anxiety attacks about 
a possible loss of Arctic sovereignty; this fear did not mate-
rialize in the opinion polls analyzed. Hence, the idea that 
the Canadian population shares fearful assessments about 
Canadian Arctic sovereignty because certain media, aca-
demic, and political elites are popularizing these narratives 
does not gather empirical traction. 
Additionally, Canadians are not as supportive of bol-
stering Canada’s military presence in the Arctic as first 
thought, especially when the military option is presented 
FIG. 4. Preferred approaches to solving international disputes over Arctic 
borders and resources, as expressed in the Rethinking the Top of the World 
surveys conducted in 2010 and 2015 (EKOS, 2011, 2015).
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alongside socio-economic, environmental, or cultural alter-
natives. In these cases, a military-centered strategy does 
not seem to be the preferred solution of Canadians to assert 
Arctic sovereignty. Rather, what emerges is a much more 
complex picture of public preferences for possible future 
solutions. Support for an approach rooted in conciliation 
and regional regime building is much more robust than sup-
port for confrontation and exclusion. Hence, if we think that 
governments in democratic regimes must respond at least 
partially to public preferences, the Canadian government 
should note the suggestion of the public to move away from 
a military-first approach. The logical rationale presented by 
Lackenbauer—that specific elites created national, popular 
anxiety, prompting calls for more defense spending—then 
breaks down, since the national anxiety element is certainly 
not predominant in Canadian public opinion. 
Canadian public opinion regarding Russia is indicative 
of this phenomenon. Even though most Canadians viewed 
Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict as a serious 
threat (Angus Reid, 2014), a majority of Canadians (63%) 
did not think that Arctic cooperation with Russia should 
be suspended (EKOS, 2015:3), favoring engagement 
rather than isolation. It is worthwhile mentioning that this 
bias towards a conciliatory approach increased with the 
downplay of power politics rhetoric in the Arctic and media 
coverage raising the specter of threats to Arctic sovereignty. 
Thus, public preferences can be tilted in specific directions, 
which makes them particularly susceptible to partisan 
political messaging.
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